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The United States Parol Evidence Rule under the United




The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods2 (CISG or the Convention) has been in force since 1988. 3 The
Convention's purpose is at least two-fold: 'to assure a uniform regime for ...
international sales contracts'; and to 'offer rules that will be more responsive
than the traditional national laws to the effective needs of international trade' .4
In attempting to establish a uniform law for international sale of goods
contracts, the Convention directs courts applying CISG to have 'regard ... to
its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its
application'.5 In response to this directive, courts worldwide should consider
1 A version of this article has been published in 1995 Brigham Young University Law Review. The
author wishes to thank Professor Gabridl Moens for reviewing this article.
2 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, opened for signature
11 April 1980, S Treaty Doc no 9, 98th congress, 1st session 22 (1983) 19 International Legal
Materials 671 [hereinafter CISGI. For brief summaries of the Convention's history, see JO
Honnold, Documentary History of the Uniform Law for International Sales 2-4 (Deventer,
Netherlands: Kluwer Law and Taxation, 1989) [hereinafter Documentary History]; JO Honnold,
Uniform Law for International Sales Under the 1980 United Nations Convention ss 4-10, 2nd edn
(1991) [hereinafter Uniform Law]; K Sono, 'The Vienna Sales Convention: History and
Perspective' in International Sale of Goods 1, 2-6 P Sarcevic and P Volken (eds) (1986); and DJ
Rhodes, Comment, 'The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods: Encouraging the Use of Uniform International Law' (1992) 5 Transnational Law, 387,
391-95 (highlighting the United States' participation in that history). For bibliographic information
on CISG, see CM Bianca and MJ Bonell, Commentary on the International Sales Law: The 1980
Vienna Sales Convention (Milan, Italy: Giuffre, 1987) 851-73; GR Ackerman, 'Scholarly
Commentary on Articles of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods' (1988) 21 Cornell International Law Journal 535, 537-73; and P Winship, 'A
Bibliography of Commentaries on the United Nations International Sales Convention' (1987) 21
International Law 585, as updated in P Winship, 'Bibliography', 22 International Law (1988) 605;
P Winship, 'A Bibliography of Commentaries on the United Nations International Sales
Convention: An Update' (1990) 24 International Lawyer 307; and P Winship, 'The UN Sales
Convention: A Bibliography of English Language Publications' (1994) 28 International Law 401.
To access the legislative history of the Convention by current article number, consult the table in
Documentary History, supra, 869-74.
3 J Honnold, 'Introduction to the Symposium' (1988) 21 Cornell International Law Journal 419,
419-20; 'Journal of Law and Commerce CISG Contracting States and Declarations Table' (1993)
12 Journal of Law and Commerce 283, 283 [hereinafter Declarations Table].
4 MJ Bonell, Introduction to Bianca and Bonell, supra note 2,3, 9.
5 CISG, supra note 2, Article 7(1), S Treaty Doc no 9, at 23, 19 ILM 673.
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the decisions other nations have reached in applying the Convention. 6 Over
one hundred such decisions already exist.7 Eight of these decisions have been
reached by United States' courts.8
The most recent reported United States case citing CISG, Beijing Metals
and Minerals Import/Export Corp v American Business Centre, Inc, held that
the parol evidence rule applies to contracts governed by the Convention.9
6 See E Diederichsen, 'Commentary to Journal of Law and Commerce Case I: Oberlandesgericht,
Frankfurt am Main', 14 Journal of Law and Commerce (1995) 177, 177 ('[C]onsideration has to be
given to court decisions in the various countries concerning the interpretation of the CISG ...'); JO
Honnold, 'The Sales Convention in Action - Uniform International Words: Uniform Application?',
8 Journal of Law and Commerce (1988) 207, 211 [hereinafter Uniform Application] ('In view of
the mandate in Article 7(1) ... courts in States that adopt the Sales Convention should have no doubt
as to their responsibility to consider interpretations in other countries.'); JO Honnold, 'Uniform
Laws for International Trade: Early "Care and Feeding" for Uniform Growth', 1 International
Trade and Business Law Journal (1995) 1, 8 [hereinafter Care and Feeding] ('[T]he Sales
Convention's call for interpretation 'to promote uniformity in [the Convention's] application ...' [is]
a mandate that clearly calls for due regard for interpretations in other countries.') (second alteration
in original); cf K Sutton, 'Methodology in Applying Uniform Law for International Sales (Under the
UN Convention) (Vienna 1980)' in Law and Australian Legal Thinking in the 1980s (Sydney:
University of Sydney; Melbourne: Monash University, 1986) 91, 92 ('[I]f a body of case law was
established in relation to the Convention, no doubt the Australian judiciary would seek to follow it
in the interests of uniformity. But the persuasive value of a particular judgment in a foreign court
could depend on its reputation, its status, the extent to which its decisions were binding on inferior
courts and the coverage of the national reporting system.') (discussing in general how Australia
would apply the Convention). But cf Bianca and Bonell, supra note 2, 92 ('A judge ... faced with a
question of interpretation of the Convention may discover that ... divergent solutions have been
adopted by the different national courts. As long as the conflicting decisions are rather isolated and
rendered by courts of first instance, or the divergences are to be found even within one and the same
jurisdiction, it is still possible either to choose the most appropriate solution among the different
ones so far proposed or to disregard them altogether and attempt to find a new solution.'). To aid in
the consideration of foreign decisions, 'UNCITRAL [(the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law) has] established procedures for gathering and disseminating decisions
applying the Sales Convention' as well as for preparing, translating, and distributing summaries of
those decisions. Uniform Law, supra note 2, s 93. For information on how to obtain copies of
decisions from UNCITRAL, see Care and Feeding, supra, 9 and note 19.
7 See MR Will, International Sales Law Under CISG 10 (1994) (charting over 100 cases mentioning
CISG).
8 Four reported United States cases have cited CISG: Beijing Metals and Minerals Import/Eaport
Corp v American Business Ctr, Inc, 993 F 2d 1178, 1182-83 note 9 (fifth cir 1993); Filanto SpA v
Chilewich Int'l Corp, 789 F Supp 1229, 1237-42 (SDNY 1992), appeal dismissed, 984 F 2d 58
(second cir 1993); Orbisphere Corp v United States, 726 F Supp 1344, 1355 note 7 (Ct Int'l Trade
1989); and Promaulayko v Amtorg Trading Corp, 540 A 2d 893, 897 note 2 (NJ Super Ct App Div
1988), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Promaulayko v Johns Manville Sales Corp, 562 A 2d 202
(NJ 1989). Likewise, four unreported United States cases have cited the Convention: Graves Import
Co v Chilewich Int'l Corp, no 92 Civ 3655 (JFK), 1994 WL 519996,5 note 2 (SDNY 22 Sep 1994);
Delchi Carrier, SpA v Rotorex Corp, no 88-CV-1078, 1994 WL 495787, 4-7 (NDNY 9 Sep 1994)
(mem); SV Braun, Inc v Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, SpA, no 91 Civ 8484 (LBS), 1994 WL
121680, 5 (SDNY 6 Apr 1994) (mem); and Interag Co v Stafford Phase Corp, no 89 Civ 4950
CSH, 1990 WL 71478, 4 (SDNY 22 May 1990) (mem). As one of the reported cases recognised,
'there is as yet virtually no United States case law interpreting the Sale of Goods Convention'.
Filanto, 789 F Supp 1237. Yet, 'it may safely be predicted that this will change [for] absent a
choice-of-law provision, and with certain exclusions not here relevant, the Convention governs all
contracts between parties with places of business in different nations, so long as both nations are
signatories to the Convention'. Id (citing CISG, supra note 2, Article l(1)(a), S Treaty Doc no 9, 22,
19 ILM 672).
9 Beijing Metals, 993 F 2d at 1183 n 9. This holding contradicts the dictum of the United States
district court in Filanto that 'the Convention essentially rejects ... the parol evidence rule'. Filanto,
789 F Supp 1238 note 7.
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Perhaps because the court reached this conclusion without any recorded
analysis, and only in footnote, the conclusion generated little or no
commentary in periodical literature until the spring of this year. Then the
court's holding was deemed incorrect in a well-reasoned article by Professor
Harry M Flechtner.10 This article responds in part to that article, seeking to
justify the court's elliptic conclusion in Beijing Metals.
At first glance this article's attempt to justify the Beijing Metals holding
may appear to be an attack on the strictly international approach to CISG
interpretation, an approach which many view as essential to the Convention's
10 HM Flechtner, 'More United States Decisions on the UN Sales Convention: Scope, Parol Evidence,
"Validity" and Reduction of Price Under Article 50' (1995) 14 Journal of Law and Commerce 153,
158. Others have similarly concluded that the parol evidence rule is largely inconsistent with CISG,
though this article responds primarily to Professor Flechtner's article, which directly addresses the
Beijing Metals holding. See Uniform Law, supra note 2, s 110, at 170-71 ('mhe language of
Article 8(3) ... seems adequate to override any domestic rule that would bar a tribunal from
considering the relevance of other agreements.'); RA Brand and HM Flechtner, 'Arbitration and
Contract Formation in International Trade: First Interpretations of the UN Sales Convention' (1993)
12 Journal of Law and Commerce 239, 251, 252 ('By requiring consideration of 'all relevant
circumstances' - including 'negotiations' - without excepting situations where the parties embodied
their agreement in a writing, [Article 8(3)] does overrule certain traditional applications of the parol
evidence rule'; yet 'while the rather impenetrable applications of the parol evidence rule in our
domestic law tradition should have little or no precedential value for contracts governed by CISG,
the basic principles behind the rule remain viable under the Convention'.); JE Murray jr, 'An Essay
on the Formation of Contracts and Related Matters Under the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods' (1988) 8 Journal of Law and Commerce 11, 44
('CISG rejects the parol evidence rule in the most frugal terms.'); P Winship, 'Domesticating
International Commercial Law: Revising UCC Article 2 in Light of the United Nations Sales
Convention' (1991) 37 Loy L Rev 43, 57 [hereinafter Domesticating International Law] (suggesting
that the parol evidence rule is largely inconsistent with Article 8(3) of the Convention). The
conclusion that CISG displaces the parol evidence rule finds some support in the Convention's
legislative history. During the 7th meeting of the 1st committee, the Canadian representative
proposed the addition of a paragraph to current Article 1I. 'UN Conference on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods' 1st committee, 7th meeting, 82, at 270, UN Doe A/Conf 97/19 (1980),
in Documentary History, supra note 2, 491. The new paragraph would have restricted the
admissibility of testimony contradicting a written contract. 'Report of the First Committee, UN
Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods' 1st committee, Article 10, 3, at 90,
UN Doe A/Conf 97/19 (1980), in Documentary History, supra note 2, 662. The proposed paragraph
read: 'Between the parties to a contract of sale evidenced by a written document, evidence by
witnesses shall be inadmissible for the purposes of confuting or altering its terms, unless there is
primafacie evidence resulting from a written document from the opposing party, from his evidence
or from a fact the existence of which has been clearly demonstrated. However, evidence by
witnesses shall be admissible for purposes of interpreting the written document.' Id. The Japanese
representative objected to this proposal because he believed it to be essentially a 'restatement' of the
rigid and difficult to apply parol evidence rule. 'UN Conference on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods' 1st committee, 7th meeting, 84, at 270, UN Doc A/Conf 97/19 (1980), in
Documentary History, supra note 2, 491. Though at least two representatives favoured the
amendment, the Canadian proposal 'did not seem to command wide support' and was not adopted
by the Committee. 'UN Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods' 1st committee,
7th meeting, 86, at 270, UN Doe A/Conf 97/19 (1980), in Documentary History, supra note 2, 491.
From this it might be assumed that the parol evidence rule was rejected by the drafters of CISG.
However, the limitation on testimony proffered by the Canadian representative was triggered by the
mere existence of a writing. 'UN Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods' 1st
committee, 7th meeting, 84, at 270, UN Doe A/Conf 97/19 (1980), in Documentary History, supra
note 2, 491. Because the United States parol evidence rule, in contrast, is triggered by the
integrationist intent of the parties, that rule was not explicitly rejected by the Committee along with
the Canadian proposal.
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success and which decries the use of domestic law.11 The article should be
viewed, however, as a healthy counterpoint to the widely-supported
internationalist approach. As such a counterpoint, the article explores
weaknesses in the strictly international position and may facilitate formulation
of a more defensible strategy for applying CISG.
In seeking to justify the holding that the parol evidence rule applies to
contracts governed by CISG, this article will first summarise the mechanics of
the parol evidence rule. Next the article will review the facts and relevant
holding of Beijing Metals. Finally, and most importantly, this article will
develop two arguments supporting that holding: first, that the parol evidence
rule is essentially an expression of CISG Article 8 and serves the international
uniformity goal of Article 7, so that the rule legitimately may be applied under
the Convention; 12 and second, that the parol evidence rule addresses a
problem governed, but left unresolved, by the Convention and conforms to
general principles underlying the Convention, so that the rule may be applied
to CISG contracts. Based on these two arguments, the article concludes that
the Fifth Circuit's application of the parol evidence rule may well have been
justified, whether or not the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods also applied.
The parol evidence rule
The parol evidence rule guides courts in the United States and other common
law countries in their initial determination of the content of written
11 See Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
Prepared by the Secretariat, 'UN Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods'
Article 6, committee 1, at 17-18, UN Doc A/Conf 97/19 (1980), in Documentary History, supra
note 2, 407-08 ('National rules on the law of sales of goods are subject to sharp divergences in
approach and concept. Thus, it is especially important to avoid differing constructions of the
provisions of this Convention by national courts, each dependent upon the concepts used in the legal
system of the country of the forum.'); MJ Bonell, 'Introduction' to Bianca and Bonell, supra note 2,
19 ('The Convention's main purpose is to bring about uniformity at a world-wide level in the law of
international sales contracts. To this end it is ... important that its provisions be interpreted in the
same way in various countries.'); Ackerman, supra note 2, 535-36 ('[CISG] is a transnational law
with a transnational legislative history. Thus, its interpretation must also be transnational.');
Flechtner, supra note 10, 176 ('It is critical to the long term success of CISG that courts apply it
from a perspective that transcends the purely domestic sales law concepts with which they are
familiar.'). Strict uniformity is not possible, however, unless courts are willing to follow uncritically
the court that first interprets each CISG provision, whether the court's interpretation is correct or
not. When flawed interpretations arise, divergence in application of the Convention is clearly
desirable. As John Honnold noted in speaking of the UCC, 'a carefully considered decision to differ
from decisions in other [jurisdictions] probably provides a healthy opportunity for reconsideration
of doubtful decisions - a value that can counterbalance some degree of loss in uniformity'. Care
and Feeding, supra note 6, 8, note 7.
12 But cf Uniform Application, supra note 6, 208-09 (treating 'the tendency to think that the words we
see are merely trying ... to state the domestic rule we know so well' as a flawed approach to CISG
interpretation).
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contracts. 13 Unfortunately, the United States version of the rule is not uniform.
It has both statutory and varied common law manifestations. The statutory
version - found in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 14 - applies to
contracts governed by Article 2 of that Code. Since both Article 2 and the
Convention govern sale of goods contracts, 15 the UCC version of the parol
evidence rule is likely to apply to contracts covered by the Convention. 16
Yet there may be instances when the common law parol evidence rule will
apply to CISG contracts. 17 The paradigm common law parol evidence rule,
summarised in Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 18 actually differs little
from the statutory version. The basic operation of the two versions can thus be
jointly outlined as follows. 19
13 Australia, for example, applies a version of the parol evidence rule. For an overview of the
Australian parol evidence rule, see BK Grossman and MP Ellinghaus, 'Classification and
Construction of Terms' 7 The Laws of Australia 7.4[5], 7.4[45]-[64] (JA Riordan (ed), 1993). Like
the United States parol evidence rule, the prevailing version of the Australian parol evidence rule
does not apply until the court determines that the written contract in question is complete. See id
7.4[53]. However, unlike the United States rule, the Australian rule directs the court to examine the
parties' objective, rather than subjective, intent in determining whether the writing is exclusive. See
id 7.4[51]. When the writing 'is apparently complete on its face', the 'presumption [is] that the
parties intended [the] written document to be the sole and exclusive repository of their agreement'.
Id 7.4[52]. If the writing is deemed complete and exclusive, 'extrinsic evidence cannot be admitted
to subtract from, add to, vary or contradict the language of the written instrument', Id 7.4[5 1]. If, on
the other hand, the writing 'is only a partial ... record of the contract', '[elvidence of additional
terms is admissible'. Id 7.4[53]. In interpreting the writing, whether complete or not, '[e]xtrinsic
evidence is [similarly] admissible as an aid to interpretation' but only when 'the language of the
document ... [is] ambiguous ... and the evidence ... [is] of more than merely unilateral intention', Id
7.4[54]. Since the Australian parol evidence rule, in contrast to the United States nile, focuses on the
objective rather than subjective intent of the parties and limits the use of extrinsic evidence in
interpreting written contracts, the Australian rule is more likely displaced by the Convention. See
infra notes 47 and 52 and text accompanying note 52. To the extent that the Australian parol
evidence rule mirrors the United States rule, however, the arguments advanced in this article would
also justify application of the Australian rule to CISG contracts. Nonetheless, this article's
arguments are based on the United States version of the rule.
14 UCC ss 2-202 (1994).
15 UCC ss 2-102 ('Mhis Article applies to transactions in goods ...'); CISG, supra note 2, Article 1, S
Treaty Doe no 9, 22, 19 ILM 672 ('This Convention applies to contracts of sale of goods ... ');
Flechtner, supra note 10, 162.
16 The fact that the UCC parol evidence rule will apply to most contracts governed by CISG minimises
any argument that the mere variety of parol evidence rules makes the rule inconsistent with CISG's
goal of uniformity.
17 Flechtner, supra note 10, 161-65 (arguing that the contract in Beijing Metals may have been
governed by CISG even if, as the court found, it did not fall within the scope of UCC Article 2).
18 Although common law parol evidence rules undoubtedly vary among the States, this Article will
only deal with one common law parol evidence rule, that summarised in the Restatement. See 2
Restatement (Second) of Contracts ss 209-18 (1979) [hereinafter Restatement 2d].
19 For more detailed, yet easy to follow, explanations of both the Restatement and UCC parol evidence
rules, see JD Gordon m, 'Teaching Parol Evidence' (1990) Brigham Young University Law Review
647, 3; AL Corbin, Corbin on Contracts (St Paul, Minn: West Publishing Co, 1960), Chapter 26
(1960 and Supp 1994) offers a more comprehensive look at the parol evidence rule generally. JJ
White and RS Summers, Handbook of the Lav Under the Uniform Commercial Code ss 2-9 to 12
(2nd edn, 1980) provides more extensive discussion of the UCC parol evidence rule.
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In identifying the content of written contracts under the parol evidence
rule, the court first asks whether the writing is partially integrated, ie whether
the writing is final and complete as to some terms.20 The court next asks
whether the writing is a complete integration - whether it contains the
'complete and exclusive' terms of the parties' agreement. 21 Historically,
courts used either of two approaches to determine, as required by the
foregoing questions, whether a writing was a partial or complete integration.
The Williston approach dictated that a court look primarily to the terms of the
writing, as interpreted by a reasonable person in the circumstances, to
determine whether an integration was intended. 22 The Corbin approach
instructed courts to look to all relevant evidence surrounding the agreement to
decide whether the parties actually intended the writing to be complete and
exclusive.23 Professor Corbin's approach has been adopted by both the
Restatement and the UCC.24 Thus, modem courts applying the Restatement or
20 See 2 Restatement 2d, supra note 18, s 209(1) ('An integrated agreement is a writing or writings
constituting a final expression of one or more terms of an agreement.'); id s 210(2) ('A partially
integrated agreement is an integrated agreement other than a completely integrated agreement.');
UCC ss 2-202 (defining what the Restatement calls an integration as 'a writing intended by the
parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein').
21 See 2 Restatement 2d, supra note 18, s 210(1) ('A completely integrated agreement is an integrated
agreement adopted by the parties as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the
agreement.'); UCC ss 2-202(b) (describing what the Restatement terms a completely integrated
agreement as a 'writing ... intended ... as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the
agreement').
22 See 4 S Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts s 633, 3rd edn (1961) 1014-15 ('It is generally
held that the contract must appear on its face to be incomplete in order to permit parol evidence of
additional terms.'); id 1016 ('If upon inspection and study of the writing, read, it may be, in the light
of surrounding circumstances in order to insure its proper understanding and interpretation, it appears
to contain the engagement of the parties, and to define the object and measure the extent of such
engagement, it constitutes the contract between them, and is presumed to contain the whole of that
contract.') (quoting Eighmie v Taylor, 98 NY 288, 294-95 (1885)); see also 1 Williston, supra, s 95,
at 349-50 ('It is even conceivable that a contract may be formed which is in accordance with the
intention of neither party. If a written contract is entered into, the meaning and effect of the contract
depends on the interpretation given the written language by the court. The court will give that
language its natural and appropriate meaning; and, if the words are unambiguous, will not even admit
evidence of what the parties may have thought the meaning to be.').
23 See 3 Corbin, supra note 19, s 582, at 455 (In determining whether the parties intended their written
agreement to be an integration, 'no relevant testimony should be excluded ... This is what the wiser
courts, seeking justice in each case, have in truth been doing.'); see also AL Corbin, 'The
Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule', (1965) 50 Cornell LQ 161, 161 (attacking the
position 'that extrinsic evidence is not admissible to aid the court in the interpretation of a written
contract (an integration) if the written words are themselves plain and clear and unambiguous').
24 See 2 Restatement 2d, supra note 18, ss 209 cmt c, 210 cmt b, 214; UCC ss 2-202 cmt 1. Under the
Restatement: That a writing was or was not adopted as a completely integrated agreement may be
proved by any relevant evidence. A document in the form of a written contract, signed by both
parties and apparently complete on its face, may be decisive of the issue in the absence of credible
contrary evidence. But a writing cannot of itself prove its own completeness, and wide latitude must
be allowed for inquiry into circumstances bearing on the intention of the parties. 2 Restatement 2d,
supra note 18, s 210 cmt b. [UCC] section [2-202 likewise] rejects: (a) Any assumption that
because a writing has been worked out which is final on some matters, it is to be taken as including
all the matters agreed upon; (b) The premise that the language used has the meaning attributable to
such language by rules of construction existing in the law rather than the meaning which arises out
of the commercial context in which it was used; and (c) The requirement that a condition precedent...
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UCC tests consider extrinsic evidence and focus on the parties' actual intent in
determining whether a written contract is a partial or complete integration.
If the court determines that a writing is a partial integration, 'evidence of
prior or contemporaneous agreements or negotiations is not admissible ... to
contradict a term of the writing.'2 5 Nevertheless, the partial integration 'may
be explained or supplemented ... by evidence of consistent additional terms',26
unless 'the additional terms are such that, if agreed upon, they would certainly
have been included in the document' 27 or are such 'as in the circumstances
might naturally be omitted from the writing'. 28 If the writing is deemed a
complete integration, not even 'consistent additional terms' may be admitted
to supplement the writing.29 Whether the writing is integrated or not, evidence
of usage of trade, course of dealing, and course of performance is admissible
to explain or supplement the agreement. 30 Similarly, regardless whether the
writing is integrated, evidence of '[a]greements and negotiations prior to or
contemporaneous with the adoption of a writing are admissible ... to establish
... the meaning of the writing.' 31
... to the admissibility of the type of evidence specified in paragraph (a) is an original determination
by the court that the language used is ambiguous. UCC ss 2-202 cmt 1; see also RA HiUman et al,
Common Law and Equity Under the Uniform Commercial Code 3.05[2] (1985) ('Presumably under
the Code, which seeks to enforce the parties' bargain in fact, [the] common law [four comers]
approach has been displaced and extrinsic evidence will be admitted as a preliminary matter to
determine the intentions of the parties on integration of their agreement. At any rate, this more
liberal approach ... can be employed under the Code ...); White and Summers, supra note 19,
ss 2-10, at 79 ('Comment 3 to 2-202 may reject a four comers test.').
25 2 Restatement 2d, supra note 18, s 215; see also UCC ss 2-202 ('Terms ... set forth in a writing
intended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are
included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a
contemporaneous oral agreement...').
26 UCC ss 2-202; see also 2 Restatement 2d, supra note 18, s 216(1) ('Evidence of a consistent
additional term is admissible to supplement [a partially] integrated agreement...').
27 UCC ss 2-202 cmt 3.
28 2 Restatement 2d, supra note 18, s 216(2)(b).
29 Id s 216(1); UCC ss 2-202(b).
30 UCC ss 2-202; see 2 Restatement 2nd, supra note 18, s 222(3) (usage of trade); id s 223(2) (course
of dealing) (It should be noted that Restatement ss 222 and 223 are not classed with the
Restatement's parol evidence provisions.).
31 2 Restatement 2d, supra note 18, s 214. The Restatement even allows 'extrinsic evidence [to] ...
change the plain meaning of a writing'. Id s 212 cmt b. The UCC, on the other hand, does not
expressly admit parol evidence to aid in interpreting a writing. The UCC does, however, permit
evidence of 'course of dealing or usage of trade ... or ... course of performance' to alter the meaning
of the writing. UCC ss 2-202(a). In addition, '[c]onsistent with [the] definition of agreement
[adopted in UCC ss 1-201(3)], the Code directs courts to admit extrinsic evidence liberally to
determine the meaning of the words of the agreement ... [Like the Restatement, the Code thus
displaces the common law plain meaning rule.' Hillman et al, supra note 24, 3.07[2][a][i], 3-34
(footnote omitted); see also Task Force of the ABA. Subcommittee on General Provisions, Sales,
Bulk Transfers, and Documents of Title, Committee on the Uniform Commercial Code, An
Appraisal of 1 March 1990, 'Preliminary Report of the Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 Study
Group' (1991) 16 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 981, 1048 (suggesting that the revised UCC
should clarify that the Code rejects the plain meaning rule in the interpretation of written contracts,
though apparently advocating the rule 'that extrinsic evidence is admissible if "relevant to prove a
meaning to which the language is reasonably susceptible".') (quoting A Kemp Fisheries, Inc v
Castle and Cooke, Inc, 852 F.2d 493, 495 (9th Cir 1988)).
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The parol evidence rule, then, focuses on the intention of the parties. Their
intent, circumstantially manifest, determines whether their written agreement
is an integration and defines the terms of their writing. The rule thus seeks to
ensure that the parties' expectations and understandings will not be frustrated
by extrinsic evidence. 32 In addition, the parol evidence rule is intended to
effect at least three public policies: to protect 'written contracts against
perjured or otherwise unreliable testimony of oral terms'; to exclude 'prior
agreements which have been superseded by the [written contract] under a
theory of merger'; and to motivate 'parties to put their complete agreement in
writing'.33 It may have been with these valuable policies in mind that the court
in Beijing Metals applied the parol evidence rule to exclude evidence of
contemporaneous oral agreements.
Beying Metals
The facts of Beijing Metals are, in reality, of little relevance to this article, as
its purpose is not to determine whether CISG governed the Beijing Metals
contract 34 nor whether the Fifth Circuit reached an accurate conclusion under
the parol evidence rule. This article assumes that the Beijing Metals contract
fell within the Convention's scope and rather asserts, as explained above, that
the court nonetheless justifiably found the parol evidence rule applicable.
Because this conclusion is a proposition of law, it may be evaluated in
isolation from the facts. Nevertheless, a brief overview of the Beijing Metals
facts will illustrate the type of situation which gives rise to the legal issue with
which this article deals.
American Business Center, Inc (ABC), an American marketer,35 entered
into a deal with Beijing Metals and Minerals Import/Export Co (MMB), a
manufacturing concern organised under the law of and doing business in the
People's Republic of China,36 for the production and marketing of exercise
equipment.37 In violation of the parties' modified agreement, ABC 'refused to
pay for approximately 27 shipments totalling more than $1.2m'.38 MMB
warned that it would cease scheduled shipments unless ABC tendered a
payment plan. 39 Representatives of ABC and MMB met and negotiated a
32 See White and Summers, supra note 19, ss 2-9, at 76 ('[A] rule [such as UCC ss 2-202] ... is
supposed to provide added assurance that the court will arrive at the truth as to disputed terms.').
33 Gordon, supra note 19, 647 (citing J Calamari and J Perillo, The Law of Contracts, 3rd edn (St Paul,
Minn: West Publishing, 1987) 137).
34 Professor Flechtner argues that the contract in Beijing Metals may well have been governed by
CISG. Flechtner, supra note 10, 163. The court in Beiing Metals, however, did not decide the issue.
See Beging Metals, 993 F 2d, 1183 note 9.
35 Flechtner, supra note 10, 154; see also Beiing Metals, 993 F 2d, 1179-80.
36 Beiing Metals, 993 F 2d, 1179 note 1; Flechtner, supra note 10, 154,
37 Beiing Metals, 993 F 2d, 1179-80.
38 Id 1180.
39 Id.
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written agreement in which ABC recognised its debt and committed to pay its
obligation in specified installments. 4° Allegedly, the parties orally agreed to
two additional terms: that MMB 'would ship goods to compensate for
[previous] non-conforming and defective goods and shortages'; and that
MMB would make new shipments on a 'document against acceptance' basis,
giving 'ABC 90 days to pay' for shipments (D/A 90).41 After these
negotiations had been concluded, MMB informed ABC that MvB would not
allow D/A 90 terms; 42 ABC thereupon refused to comply with the
agreement. 43 MMB sued to enforce the contract.44 In defence, ABC argued
that MMB had breached at least one of the alleged oral terms.4 5 The district
court held and the Fifth Circuit agreed 'that ABC [was] barred by the parol
evidence rule from introducing extrinsic evidence to alter the terms of the
written agreement'. 4 6 Thus, against a claim of oral alteration, the payment
agreement stood, to ABC's detriment. Had the parol evidence rule not been
applied, the case's outcome may well have been different.47
Justifying the court's holding
Professor Flechtner takes issue with the Beijing Metals holding, arguing that
the parol evidence rule is inconsistent with CISG because 'the Convention
rejects any special methodology [such as the parol evidence rule] for
determining the parties' intent as to the effect of a writing'.48 Professor








47 See Flechiner, supra note 10, 165 (arguing that if the payment agreement in Beijing Metals fell
'within the scope of CISG ... the Fifth Circuit should have applied the Convention's approach to
parol evidence questions - with results likely to differ from those the court obtained by applying the
Texas common law parol evidence rule').
48 Id 158. In reaching this conclusion, Professor Flechtner essentially concedes that, because the
modem parol evidence rule admits extrinsic evidence to guide the interpretation of written contracts,
Article 8(3) is consistent with the parol evidence rule when the rule is applied to interpretation. See
Flechtner, supra note 10, 157-58; see also Brand and Flechtner, supra note 10, 252 ('Evidence of
prior negotiations going to the interpretation of a written contract is admissible under CISG just as it
is under the parol evidence rule.'). Compare 2 Restatement 2d, supra note 18, s 212 illus 4 (if buyer
and seller orally agree that buy means sell and sell means buy, their oral agreement will control the
interpretation of their written contract) with Bianca and Bonell, supra note 2, 98 (Under Article
8(1), if seller and buyer agree 'to show a price of 50,000 in the contract, rather than the true price of
100,000, ... their contract will be interpreted according to their common understanding, 100,000 not
50,000'). This Article thus assumes that the application of the parol evidence rule to interpretive
questions may be viewed as an implementation of the Convention and focuses on establishing that
the rule may also be seen as an application of CISG when the rule is used to determine 'the parties'
intent as to the effect of [their] writing.' Flechtner, supra note 10, 158.
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and, in particular, from the fact that the Convention 'lack[s] ... any provision ...
affording special treatment to parol evidence questions'.49 In as much as
Professor Flechtner's conclusion is based on the absence of a CISG parol
evidence provision, his conclusion is incorrect. If the Convention did give
special treatment to the parol evidence issue, that treatment would either
support or displace application of the parol evidence rule. When the
Convention does not give special treatment to a rule of law, however, the rule
is not automatically displaced. Instead, the rule's fate depends on whether the
Convention settles issues within the rule's scope against the rule, and if the
Convention does not settle those issues, on whether the rule conforms with the
general principles of the Convention. 50 This section argues first that CISG
Article 8 settles questions regarding both the determination of the parties'
intent as to the effect of their writing and the admissibility of extrinsic
evidence consistent with the parol evidence rule, so that courts may apply the
parol evidence as an expression of Article 8. This initial argument is
buttressed by the fact that the parol evidence rule satisfies the international
uniformity mandate of Article 7(1).51 Second, this section alternatively
contends that CISG governs, but does not expressly settle, parol evidence
issues and that the parol evidence rule conforms 'with the general principles
[of CISG]', so that, consistent with Article 7(2), the parol evidence rule may
be applied to CISG contracts.52
The parol evidence rule: an application of Article 8 consistent with the
international mandate of Article 7
The parol evidence rule as an application of Article 8
Article 8 essentially dictates that, in interpreting the effect of a written
contract, the court should focus on each party's subjective intent if that intent
was known by or 'could not have been' unknown to the other party; 53
otherwise the court should look to the parties' objective intent, ie 'to the
understanding that a reasonable person of the same kind as the other party
would have had in the same circumstances' .54 More importantly, in assessing
the parties' subjective intent or the understanding of a similarly-situated
reasonable person, the court is to give 'due consideration ... to all relevant
49 Flechtner, supra note 10, 158.
50 See CISG, supra note 2, Article 7(2), S Treaty Doc no 9, at 23-24, 19 ILM 673.
51 See CISG, supra note 2, Article 7(1), S Treaty Doc no 9, at 23, 19 ILM 673.
52 See CISG, supra note 2, Article 7(2), S Treaty Doc no 9, at 24, 19 ILM 673.
53 CISG, supra note 2, Article 8(1), S Treaty Doc no 9, at 24, 19 ILM 673.
54 Id Article 8(2); see 'Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, Prepared by the Secretariat, UN Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
Article 7', cmt 4, 18, UN Doc A/Conf 97/19 (1980), in Documentary History, supra note 2, 408
(explaining the initial subjective and default objective inquiries mandated by a predecessor of
Article 8).
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circumstances of the case including the negotiations, any practices which the
parties have established between themselves, usages and any subsequent
conduct of the parties'. 55 Thus, Article 8 instructs courts to consider
circumstantial parol evidence in interpreting the effect of written contracts.
At first glance, then, the parol evidence rule appears inconsistent with
Article 8. If the modem version of the rule did prevent consideration of all
parol evidence, or if it embraced Professor Williston's limited approach to
determining integrationist intent,56 the rule would clearly be inconsistent with
Article 8. 57 If inconsistent, the rule would just as clearly be displaced by
CISG.58 The legislative history and language of Article 8, however, indicate
that the parol evidence rule may well be viewed as an expression of Article 8.
(a) The legislative history of Article 8
Article 8 underwent significant modification as it progressed through the
legislative process that led to its incorporation into the Convention.59 Early in
its formulation, the future Article 8(3) read:
The intent of the parties or the intent a reasonable person would have had
in the same circumstances ... [may] [is to] be determined in the light of the
circumstances of the case including the [preliminary] negotiations, any
practices which the parties have established between themselves, any
55 CISG, supra note 2, Article 8(3), S Treaty Doc no 9,24, 19 ILM 673.
56 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
57 The legislative history of Article 8 makes clear that courts applying the Convention should consider
extrinsic evidence in identifying the terms and effect of a contract regardless whether the contract is
embodied in a writing or whether the writing appears clear on its face. See 'Report of the Working
Group on the International Sale of Goods on the Work of its Eighth Session' [1977] VIII UN
Comm'n Int'l Trade L YB 155, 168, at 86, 87, UN Doc A/CN9/Ser A11977, in Documentary
History, supra note 2, 287, 288 (documenting that a provision that was part of a predecessor to
Article 8 and that required the circumstances listed in Article 8(3) 'to be considered, even though
they have not been embodied in writing or in any special form' was deleted, because it was deemed
unnecessary, likely because the predecessor to Article 8 already made this principle clear);
'Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Prepared
by the Secretariat, UN Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods' Article 7, cmt
5, 6, 18, UN Doc A/Conf 97/19 (1980), in Docunentary History, supra note 2,408 ('In determining
the intent of a party or the intent a reasonable person would have had in the same circumstances, it
is necessary to look first to the words actually used or the conduct engaged in. However, the
investigation is not to be limited to those words or conduct even if they appear to give a clear
answer to the question ... In order to go beyond the apparent meaning of the words or the conduct by
the parties, Article [8](3) states that "due consideration is to be given to all relevant circumstances
of the case".') (quoting a draft version of Article 8(3)).
58 See United States Const Article VI, cl 2 ('[A]U treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding.'); see also Domesticating International Law, supra note 10, 43 ('As a treaty made
under the authority of the United States, the Convention is the 'supreme Law' of the United States
and would prevail over conflicting State law.') (quoting United States Const Article VI, cl 2).
59 Compare eg 'Article 14 of the Draft Convention on the Formation of Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods as Approved or Deferred for Further Consideration by the Working Group on the
International Sale of Goods at Its Eighth Session' [1977] VIII UN Comm'n Int'l Trade L YB 90,
UN Doc A/CN9/Ser A/1977, in Documentary History, supra note 2,291, with the version of Article
8 adopted by the Convention, CISG, supra note 2, Article 8, S Treaty Doc no 9,24, 19 ILM 673.
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conduct of the parties subsequent to the conclusion of the contract, usages
... and any applicable legal rules for contracts of sale'.60
The italicised clause may well have accommodated application of the parol
evidence rule in determining the subjective or objective intent of the parties, as
the parol evidence rule is a legal rule that applies to contracts generally and is
made applicable to 'contracts of sale' specifically through
ss 2-202 of the UCC.61 As Article 8 evolved, the clause was deleted, not
because it was inconsistent with the principles of Article 8, but because it was
deemed 'unnecessary'.62 That legal rules applicable to sales contracts - at
least those rules consistent with Article 8 - would continue to apply in
determining the parties' intent after the enactment of Article 8 may thus have
seemed apparent to the working group. Although the point is not as apparent
to commentators today, this bit of legislative history suggests that the
Convention may well accommodate the parol evidence rule, particularly since
the rule is essentially an expression of Article 8.63
(b) The language of Article 8
The text of Article 8 supports the conclusion that the parol evidence rule may
be seen as an expression of that provision. As explained above, Article 8
instructs courts to determine the effect of a contract according to the parties'
subjective intent, or failing that, according to their objective intent.64 Further,
Article 8 directs courts to look 'to all relevant circumstances' in determining
that intent.65 The parol evidence rule implements these instructions. It requires
the court to determine whether a writing is completely or partially integrated
60 'Report of the Working Group on the International Sale of Goods on the Work of Its Eighth
Session' [1977] VIII UN Comm'n Int'l Trade L YB 155, 86, UN Doc. AICN9ISer A/1977, in
Documentary History, supra note 2, 287 (emphasis added - brackets in original) (quoting a draft
text of Article 14(4) of the 1964 Hague Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, which was under revision).
61 Of course, this clip of legislative history is not determinative. While the plain language of the
italicised clause certainly could accommodate application of the parol evidence rule, the clause may
well have had a different meaning to members of the working group. At the least, the clause raises
doubts as to whether Article 8 was meant categorically to displace application of the parol evidence
rule. But see 'UN Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods' 1st committee, 6th
meeting, 51, at 262, UN Doc A/Conf 97/19 (1980), in Documentary History, supra note 2,483. Yet,
according to the Australian representative to the first committee, no provision similar to Article 8
'existed in the common law countries, due to the prohibition of "parol evidence", a rule which
should be amended in respect of international trade'. Id. The Australian representative's comment
indicates that he felt that a blanket prohibition on parol evidence was inappropriate in international
trade and would be displaced by the later draft of Article 8 that he was considering. However,
because the modem version of the parol evidence rule does not exclude all parol evidence, see supra
notes 25-30 and accompanying text, the rule is not automatically inconsistent with or precluded by
Article 8.
62 'Report of the Working Group on the International Sale of Goods on the Work of Its Eighth
Session' [1977] VIII UN Comm'n Int'l Trade L YB 166, 87, UN Doc A/CN9/Ser A/1977, in
Documentary History, supra note 2, 288.
63 But see supra note 10.
64 See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
65 CISG, supra note 2, Article 8(3), S Treaty Doc no 9, at 24, 19 ILM 673.
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by looking to the intent of the parties,66 intent that may be indicated 'by any
relevant evidence'.67 Initially at least, the parol evidence rule appears a mere
application of Article 8.68 Yet the rule may require the use of what Professor
Flechtner calls 'a distinct set of tests and procedures for ascertaining ... the
parties [intent]'.69 '[Tihe Convention,' he contends, clearly 'rejects any special
methodology for determining the parties' intent as to the effect of a writing.' 70
Professor Flechtner's conclusion is not immune from dispute, however.
The language of Article 8 indicates that in determining intent 'due
consideration is to be given to all relevant circumstances of the case including
the negotiations, any practices which the parties have established between
66 See supra note 24.
67 2 Restatement 2d, supra note 18, s 210 cmt b.
68 See Brand and Flechtner, supra note 10, 251 ('At bottom, the parol evidence rule is merely a
particular application of the fundamental "intent principle" of contract law ... Far from invalidating
such a rule, CISG Article 8(3) emphasises the importance of the parties' intent ... '); see also
Uniform Law, supra note 2, s 110, at 171 ('The Convention ... would not interfere with the decision
to exclude from a jury evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements if ... "the court finds"(after giving due consideration to all relevant circumstances) that the writing was "intended also as a
complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement".') (quoting UCC ss 2-202)
(emphasis in Unifonn Law).
69 Flechmer, supra note 10, 158. Specifically, Professor Flechtner objects to the presumption that a
writing is intended as an integration, see 2 Restatement 2d, supra note 18, s 209(3), and the rule that
consistent additional terms may be proved to supplement a partial integration only if those terms
might reasonably have been omitted or, if adopted by the parties, would definitely have been
recorded in the writing, see supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. See Flechtner, supra note 9,
159-60. In response to Professor Flechtner's concerns, it should be noted that the presumption that
a writing is intended as an integration is only explicit in the Restatement version of the parol
evidence rule. See 2 Restatement 2d, supra note 18, s 209(3). Any conflict with Article 8 that this
presumption might present is therefore marginalised by the fact that the UCC version of the parol
evidence rule will normally apply to sales contracts governed by CISG. See supra notes 15-16 and
accompanying text. Further, the presumption acts as a default, providing the court direction when
the evidence does not indicate that the intent of the parties or of a reasonable person is contrary to
the written agreement. See id s 209 cmt c (stating that '[w]hether a writing has been adopted as an
integrated agreement is ... to be determined in accordance with all relevant evidence' and indicating
that the presumption of integration applies only 'in the absence of contrary evidence'). In such
situations, the Convention does not indicate what the court should do, so the court may legitimately
look to domestic law for guidance, see infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text, and may certainly
settle on a default such as the parol evidence rule which would appear internationally acceptable in
these situations and which is consistent with the general principle of the Convention, recognised in
Article 12, that contracting States may protect their interests in written agreements, see infra part
IV.B.4. As to Professor Flechtner's objection to the consistent additional terms rule, Professor
Fletchner concedes that at least the Texas version of the rule 'might [by itself] be an unobjectionable
method for determining whether alleged terms form a transaction separate from the one integrated
into a writing, and thus outside the intended preclusive scope of the integration'. Flechtner, supra
note 9, 160. Professor Flechtner's main objection is that the rule is so 'encrusted by purely domestic
precedent' that '[ilt would now be virtually impossible for a United States court to use the test in a
manner that was genuinely international and that would promote uniformity with decisions by
courts of other contracting States' as Article 7(1) intends. Id. That a rule is of domestic origin is not
reason enough to reject it, however. If the rule is not displaced by the Convention, is consistent with
the Convention, and promotes international uniformity in some way, the rule arguably remains valid
under the Convention. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
70 Flechtner, supra note 9, 158; see also Brand and Flechtner, supra note 10, 251 (like the parol
evidence rule, 'CISG Article 8(3) emphasises the importance of the parties' intent - although clearly
the Convention does not adopt the somewhat bizarre and abstruse methods for determining intent
associated with the parol evidence rule.').
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themselves, usages and any subsequent conduct of the parties'.71 Intent, then,
is controlling; parol evidence must only be given 'due consideration' under the
Convention. The parol evidence rule implements Article 8 by making intent
the touchstone in determining whether an integration exists and consequently
whether the parol evidence rule should apply to protect that integration.
Arguably, at least, the parol evidence rule also applies the instructions of
Article 8 by giving 'due consideration ... to all relevant circumstances of the
case'.72 Indeed, under the parol evidence rule, the judge considers 'all relevant
evidence' in determining the parties' intent to integrate.73 In addition, the rule
admits to the fact finder evidence of usage of trade, course of dealing, and
course of performance to interpret and augment the writing.74 And finally, if
the writing is only partially integrated, the rule also generally admits 'evidence
of consistent additional terms' to explain or supplement the writing. 75
True, the parol evidence rule applies some objective tests or
presumptions, 76 but Article 8 itself was intended to be less subjective than
might be supposed. The drafters of Article 8 explicitly tempered its subjective
focus by changing one of the triggers for application of the subjective test
from 'ought to have known' to 'could not have been unaware what [the] intent
was'.77 As a result, the subjective prong of Article 8 will apply in few cases.78
In sum, the parol evidence rule may be said to comply with the express
terms and legislative intent of Article 8. The question thus becomes whether
the parol evidence rule, as an application of Article 8, is consistent with the
instruction of Article 7(1) that:
71 CISG, supra note 2, Article 8(3), S Treaty Doc no 9,24, 19 ILM 673.
72 Id.
73 2 Restatement 2d, supra note 18, s 209 cmt c; see supra note 24 and accompanying text.
74 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
75 UCC ss 2-202(b); see supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. Of course, the parol evidence rule
also admits all relevant evidence to aid in the interpretation of the writing. See supra notes 31 and
48 and accompanying text.
76 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
77 'Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of its Eleventh
Session' [19781 IX UN Comm'm Int'l Trade L YB 34, at 34, UN Doe A/CN9/Ser A/1978, in
Documentary History, supra note 2, 368; id 39 ('[I]n paragraph (1) the expression "could not have
been unaware what that intent was" replaced the expression "ought to have known what that intent
was". This reflected the concern expressed in the Commission that the previous version of
paragraph (1) contained too subjective a test.') (quoting provisions in the evolving drafts of what
became Article 8).
78 Uniform Law, supra note 2, s 107, at 164-65 ('[Biecause of the practical barriers to proving
identity between the intent of the two parties ... most problems of interpretation will be governed by
paragraph (2) which follows the "objective" approach ... '); P Volken, 'The Vienna Convention:
Scope, Interpretation, and Gap-filling', in International Sale of Goods, supra note 2, 19, 4. (The
subjective prong of Article 8 'requires a qualified addressee, for it presupposes that the [addressee]
knew or could not have been unaware of the speaker's intent. In most cases it cannot be proved that
one is dealing with a qualified addressee'. Consequently, Article 8 provides a back-up objective
standard.)
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[i]n the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its
international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its
application and the observance of good faith in international trade.7 9
Professor Flechtner, of course, argued that it was not.8 0 If, in spite of Professor
Flechtner's argument, the parol evidence rule may be said to be both
consistent with Article 8, as illustrated, and consistent with the international
thrust of Article 7(1), then the holding in Beijing Metals that the parol
evidence rule applies to contracts governed by the Convention is justifiable. It
is therefore to a discussion of the parol evidence rule's consistency with
Article 7(1) that this article turns.
The parol evidence rule, promoting international uniformity under
Article 7(1)
While many have argued that the parol evidence rule is inconsistent with the
uniformity of application sought by CISG, and while the rule is certainly
attached to domestic precedent, the rule promotes uniformity and therefore
satisfies the demands of Article 7(1) in at least two senses.81 The parol
evidence rule requires the judge, not the jury, to determine, at least initially,
the effect the parties intended for their writing.82 CISG 'has ... adherents from
each economic and legal system of the world';83 these systems also assign the
79 CISG, supra note 2, Article 7(1), S Treaty Doe no 9,23, 19 ILM 673.
80 See Flechtner, supra note 10, 158-59.
81 But cf Bianca and Bonell, supra note 2, 74 (arguing that 'to have regard to the ["]international
character["l of the Convention ... implies the necessity of interpreting its terms and concepts
autonomously, ... not by referring to the meaning which might traditionally be attached to them
within a particular domestic law').
82 See 2 Restatement 2d, supra note 18, ss 209(2), 210(3) ('Whether there is an integrated agreement'
as well as 'lwlhether an agreement is completely or partially integrated is to be determined by the
court as a question preliminary to determination of a question of interpretation or to application of
the parol evidence rule.'. While the Restatement characterises the court's determination as to the
effect of a writing as preliminary to the application of the parol evidence rule, the determination
may well be considered the threshold inquiry mandated by and therefore part of the rule.); UCC
ss 2-202 cmt 3 (indicating that the court determines whether a writing was meant to be an
integration); While and Summers, supra note 19, ss 2-9,77 (outlining the allocation of adjudicatory
power between the judge and jury under the UCC parol evidence rule); see also Uniform Law, supra
note 2, s 110, 171 ('[The parol evidence rule has its greatest significance in restricting the role of
juries in the field of contract interpretation.'); Brand and Flechtner, supra note 10, 252 n 47 ('From
another perspective, the parol evidence rule seems primarily a rule of procedure - ie it requires the
judge rather than the jury to make the factual determination whether the parties intended to
discharge prior or contemporaneous agreements that were not included in a writing. Clearly nothing
in Article 8(3) or the rest of the Convention overrules this procedural aspect of the parole evidence
rule.') (citation omitted); Domesticating International Law, supra note 10, 57 ('To the extent that
[the UCC parol evidence rule] merely allocates the task of determining the parties' intent between
judge and jury, it is not inconsistent with the Convention.').
83 Care and Feeding, supra note 6, 1; see generally SG Zwart, 'The New International Law of Sales:
A Marriage Between Socialist, Third World, Common, and Civil Law Principles' (1988) 13 North
Carolina Journal of Iternational Law and Commercial Regulation 109, 114-23 (summarising the
Eastern bloc and developing country perspectives on CISG and discussing sensitive issues for
Eastern bloc, developing, common law, and civil law jurisdictions during the formation of the
Convention).
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interpretation of contracts to judges. 84 The parol evidence rule thus brings
United States courts into greater procedural harmony with courts of other
nations in applying the Convention.85
In addition, because judges are more likely than jurors to consider the
international character of the Convention, the parol evidence rule increases the
likelihood that United States courts will reach more internationally-uniform
results. Thus, although the rule may involve United States courts in a
mechanically different inquiry in applying Article 8,86 the rule allows
American courts both to comply with the substance of Article 8, as discussed
above, and to achieve more uniformity of result with courts of other countries.
By reducing the involvement of juries, the parol evidence rule actually
advances the Convention's uniformity goal. The parol evidence rule may thus
be applied under the Convention, as the court concluded in Beijing Metals, as
an appropriately international application of Article 8.
The parol evidence rule in harmony with general principles of the
Convention
This article has argued that the parol evidence rule is justifiably applied to
contracts governed by CISG, in part, because the rule is an implementation of
Article 8. That argument depends on the premise that the rule satisfactorily
gives 'due consideration ... to all relevant circumstances' in determining the
parties' intent, as mandated by Article 8. 87 Of course, it may be argued that
the parol evidence rule does not satisfy this requirement. The Convention itself
84 See G Casper and H Zeisel, 'Lay Judges in the German Criminal Courts' (1972) 1 J Legal Stud 135,
135-36 ('The jury has thus maintained its position mainly in the orbit of the common law ... but
more than anywhere in ... the United States, where trial by jury is standard in both criminal and civil
cases. More than 90% of the world's criminal jury trials, and nearly all of its civil jury trials, take
place in the United States ... '); Herbert J Liebesny (1981) Foreign Legal Systems: A Comparative
Analysis 312 ('There is no jury trial in civil cases in France, or for that matter in other civil law
countries.'); Max Rheinstein, 'Comparative Law - its Functions, Methods and Usages' (1968) 22
Arkansas Law Review and Bar Association Journal 416, reprinted in JH Merryman and DS Clark
(1978) Comparative Law: Western European and Latin American Legal Systens 11, 17 ('In civil
law countries trial by jury is a rare exception in criminal cases and never used at all in civil
matters.').
85 This increased uniformity is accomplished by the parol evidence rule alone and not by the
Convention, for the Convention does not affect contracting States' allocation of adjudicatory power
between judge and jury. Uniform Law, supra note 2, s 110, 171.
86 This mechanically-different inquiry may have been fashioned to deal with the challenges of jury
trial and to bring jury trials into greater harmony with bench trials. See M Rheinstein, 'Comparative
Law - its Functions, Methods and Usages' (1968) 22 Arkansas Law Review and Bar Association
Journal 416, reprinted in Merryman and Clark, supra note 84, 11, 17 ('Jury trial has ... been the
cause for the development of a special law of evidence, which ... is one of the most complicated.');
Liebesny, supra note 84, 312 ('There is no jury trial in civil cases in France, or ... in other civil law
countries. Evaluation of the evidence thus is exclusively in the hands of trained judges and the rules
are less strict than in common law.').
87 CISG, supra note 2, Article 8(3), S Treaty Doe no 9,24, 19 ILM 673.
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does not 'expressly settle' what constitutes due consideration. 88 The
Convention dictates, however, that issues such as this, which are governed but
not expressly settled by the Convention, 'are to be settled in conformity with
the general principles on which [the Convention] is based or, in the absence of
such principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of
private international law'. 89 While favouring the Convention's general
principles over domestic law, this provision nonetheless permits courts to turn
to domestic law in the first instance. 90 When a gap appears, the provision
mandates resolution 'in conformity with' the Convention's underlying
principles. 91 Thus, if a domestic law conforms to the principles of the
Convention, that law may provide the rule of decision, just as it may when no
88 CISG, supra note 2, Article 7(2), S Treaty Doc no 9, at 23-24, 19 ILM 673. It may, of course, be
argued that characterisation of the 'due consideration' issue as a gap results from a sceptical,
common law perspective inconsistent with the Convention's international focus. See P Volken, 'The
Vienna Convention: Scope, Interpretation, and Gap-filling', in International Sale of Goods, supra
note 2, 19, 43 (quoting U Huber, Der UNCITRAL-Entwurf eines Uebereinkommens uber
intemationale Warenkaufvertrage, in Rabels Z 432-33 (1979)). According to Ulrich Huber, 'The
question of what has to be considered as a gap under the Convention, cannot be answered on a mere
rational basis. Someone who has a positive stand towards the Convention will discover but few
gaps. On the other hand, if a person is sceptical about the international unification of the Sales Law,
he [or she] will every now and then run into unsettled questions. In addition, a common law jurist,
because of his [or herl legal tradition, will probably tend towards a more restrictive interpretation of
the Convention and its provisions. Thus, he [or she] might more often be confronted with a gap,
than would be a civil law jurist. Civil law jurists are more frequently used working with generally
framed, systematically conceived legal codes. Out of this experience, they are more readily prepared
to solve unsettled questions or to fill gaps by referring to the general principles contained in the code
itself.' Id; see also Unifonn Application, supra note 11, 210 (explaining that common law judges
naturally will be more prone than civil law judges to find gaps in and less prone to extract
underlying principles from CISG). While common law lawyers may be more prone to find gaps in
the Convention, the fact that the Convention defines gaps as matters governed but not expressly
settled by the Convention, see Bianca and Bonell, supra note 2, 75, 76, certainly provides a basis for
that proneness.
89 CISG, supra note 2, Article 7(2), S Treaty Doe no 9, 23-24, 19 ILM 673. For a brief summary of
the legislative history of Article 7, see P Winship, 'Private International Law and the UN Sales
Convention' (1988) 21 Cornell Int'l LJ 487, 509-15 [hereinafter Private International Law]. The
general principles of which Article 7(2) speaks may be found in 'examination of [the] various
specific provisions of the [Convention]' and of the Convention's legislative history. 'Working
Group on the International Sale of Goods; Report on the Work of the Second Session, 7-18 Dec
1970' [19711 11 UN Comm'n Int'l Trade L YB 132, at 62, UN Doc A/CN9/Ser A/1971, in
Documentary History, supra note 2, 68 (speaking of a predecessor of Article 7(2) found in the
Uniform Law on Sales); see also 'Report of the Working Group on the International Sale of Goods,
First Session, 5-16 January 1970' [19701 I UN Comm'n Int'l Trade L YB 59, at 182, UN Doe
AICN9/Ser A/1970, in Documentary History, supra note 2, 20 (referring to the Uniform Law on
Sales and explaining that '[tlhe general principles ... are the general ideas which inspired the
Uniform Law... [and that tihese principles can be gathered from the provisions of the Uniform Law,
from the legislative history of the 1964 Hague Convention [which finalised the Uniform Law on
Sales, see Documentary History, supra note 2, 1,] and from commentary on the Uniform Law.').
90 But see 'Report of the Working Group on the International Sale of Goods, First Session, 5-16
January 1970' [ 197011 UN Comm'n Int'l Trade L YB 59, at 182, UN Doe A/CN9/Ser A/1970, in
Documentary History, supra note 2, 20. By directing recourse to general principles, the drafters of a
predecessor to Article 7(2) 'wished to free judges from having to look to national law for the
solution of these problems, an avenue that would lead to disunity'. Id. When domestic laws, like the
parol evidence rule, conform to general principles and enhance uniformity, however, the drafters'
concern over disunity resulting from national law disappears or, ironically, may be best addressed
through application of the domestic law.
91 CISG, supra note 2. Article 7(2), S Treaty Doe no 9,23-24, 19 ILM 673.
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general principles apply.92 It is important that the domestic law satisfy the
international uniformity mandate of Article 7(1). In sum, in the possibly rare
situations when a domestic law both satisfies the uniformity mandate and
conforms with other general principles underlying Convention, that domestic
law may be used to resolve issues left unsettled by the Convention.
The parol evidence rule is such a law. The Beijing Metals holding - that
the parol evidence rule applies to contracts governed by the Convention - may
thus be justified on this separate ground: that the parol evidence rule is a
domestic law that resolves the unsettled issue of what constitutes 'due
consideration' in determining parties' intent, heeds the international
uniformity directive of Article 7(1), and conforms with general principles
underlying the Convention. 93 The parol evidence rule clearly provides a
solution to the 'due consideration' problem. As noted above, the parol
evidence rule is also arguably consistent with the principle of international
uniformity embodied in Article 7(l).94 Finally, the parol evidence rule is
consistent with the good faith guideline of Article 7 and the general principles
manifest in Articles 6 and 29; 9; 12 and 98.
Article 7
Aside from directing interpreting courts to consider the international character
and uniformity goal of the CISG, Article 7 instructs courts to interpret the
Convention with regard 'to the need to promote ... the observance of good
faith in international trade' .95 This good faith paradigm 'was intended to direct
92 See id; cfPrivate International Law, supra note 89, 530 (relying on the 'in conformity' language of
Article 7(2) to suggest that courts need not turn to actual domestic law, but only to rules consistent
with domestic law, when general principles fail to resolve issues governed by the Convention). But
cf Diederichsen, supra note 6, 181. Diederichsen contends that '[rieliance upon domestic rules of
conflict of law [, though possibly the only practical alternative when an issue is not resolved by
CISG,] ... does not advance the uniform interpretation and application of the Convention as required
by CISG, Article 7'. Id. While Diederichsen's assertion may often be true, domestic rules like the
parol evidence rule that actually enhance the uniform application of the Convention and that are
otherwise consistent with the Convention's underlying principles satisfy the mandates of Article 7
and therefore may apply to CISG contracts. See supra part IV.A.2; infra part IV.B. 1-4.
93 Alternatively, it may be argued that the principles underlying the Convention do not indicate what
constitutes 'due consideration', so that the court may turn to the domestic law applicable under
conflicts rules for an answer. See CISG, supra note 2, Article 7(2), S Treaty Doc no 9, 23-24, 19
ILM 673 ('[I]n the absence of [relevant general] principles, [matters governed but unresolved by
CISG are to be settled] in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private
international law.'). Assuming that United States domestic law governs, the parol evidence rule
would be the proper rule to apply, particularly since the rule is consistent with general principles
underlying CISG See infra part IV.B. 1-4.
94 See supra part IV.A.2.
95 CISG, supra note 2, Article 7(1), S Treaty Doc no 9, 23-24, 19 ILM 673. While some
representatives argued that the good faith requirement should apply only to the contracting parties,
see 'UN Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods Ist Committee, 5th meeting',
41, 43, 44, at 257-58, UN Doc A/Conf 97/19 (1980), in Documentary History, supra note 2,
478-79, the good-faith requirement actually adopted in Article 7(l) applies to the interpretation of
the Convention as well, see id 47, 49, 52, 54, 55, 258, in Documentary History. supra note 2, 479;
see also P Volken, 'The Vienna Convention: Scope, Interpretation, and Gap-filling, in International
Sale of Goods', supra note 2, 19, 42. (The good faith requirement 'was finally accepted as a general
interpretation rule to be applied to the Convention as a whole'.)
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the attention of the courts in resolving disputes to the fact that the acts and
omissions of the parties must be interpreted in the light of the principle that
they observe good faith in international trade'.96 The parol evidence rule is
consistent with this good-faith perspective. That rule prevents parties from
entering final, exclusive agreements and then seeking to escape or unilaterally
alter unfavourable terms by pleading in bad faith the existence of prior or
contemporaneous oral terms.97 The parol evidence rule thus conforms to,
indeed enforces, the good faith principle made explicit in Article 7.
Articles 6 and 29
The parol evidence rule also comports with the principle of party autonomy
embodied in Articles 6 and 29.98 Article 29, in derogation of the provision in
96 'Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of its Eleventh
Session' [19781 IX UN Comm'n Int'l Trade L YB 57, at 36, UN Doe A/CN9/Ser A/1978, in
Documentary History, supra note 2, 370. While some view the good faith requirement as an
interpretive guideline only, see Uniform Law, supra note 2, s 94, 147, Professors Bianca and Bonell
conclude that the better view is that the requirement also applies to the contracting parties. Bianca
and Bonell, supra note 2, 84. Whether the good faith requirement of Article 7(1) is deemed to apply
only to interpretation or also to the parties, good faith appears to be a general principle of the
Convention. See id 85. As such,the good faith requirement may govern the parties when their dispute
is covered but not expressly resolved by the Convention, for then general principles become rules of
decision. See id.
97 See Gordon, supra note 19, 647.
98 See 'UN Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 7th plen mtg', 25, at 206, UN
Doe AIConf 97/19 (1980), in Documentary History, supra note 2, 741 (In explaining his rejection of
a proposal to alter present Article 29, the Canadian representative commented that 'the Convention
... was based squarely on the doctrine of the autonomy of the will of the parties'); Working Group on
the International Sale of Goods; 'Report on the Work of the Second Session, 7-18 Dec 1970',
[19711 II UN Comm'n Int'l Trade L YB 46, at 55, UN Doe A/CN9/Ser A/1971, in Documentary
History, supra note 2, 61 (explaining that a predecessor of Article 6 'emphasise[d] that the
provisions of the Uniform Law are supplementary and yield to the agreement of the parties'); see
also Bianca and Bonell, supra note 2, 80 (casting 'the principle of the parties' autonomy' as one of
the general principles underlying the Convention); AH Friedman, 'The UN Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods' (1988) 7 Digest of Commercial Laws of the World 1, 3 (citing
Article 6 and concluding that '[the] primacy of the parties['] autonomy is the very essence of the
Convention'). The principle of party autonomy is also manifest in Article l(l)(b), which essentially
permits qualifying parties to choose whether the Convention will govern their contract, see CISG,
supra note I, Article I(1), l(l)(b), S Treaty Doe no 9, at 22, 19 ILM 672 (providing that the
'Convention applies to contracts of sale of goods between parties whose places of business are in
different States ... when the rules of private international law lead to the application of the law of a
contracting State' and thereby allowing parties, through the private international law principle that
the law the parties designate will govern, to choose whether the Convention will apply to their
contract), and in Article 9, which permits usages expressly or impliedly adopted by the parties to
trump conflicting provisions of CISG, see CISG, supra note 2, Article 9, S Treaty Doe no 9, at 24,
19 ILM 674; 'Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, Prepared by the Secretariat, UN Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods'
Article 8, cmt 5, at 19, UN Doe A/Conf 97/19 (1980), in Documentary History, supra note 2, 409
('Since usages which become binding on the parties do so only because they have been explicitly or
implicitly incorporated into the contract, they will be applied rather than conflicting provisions of
this Convention on the principle of party autonomy.'); 'UN Conference on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods 1st committee, 6th meeting', 77, at 264, UN Doe A/Conf 97/19 (1980),
in Documentary History, supra note 2, 485 (In the Argentinian representative's view, the rules
embodied in the predecessor of Article 9 were manifestations of 'the principle of the autonomy of
the will of the parties'.); Bianca and Boneli, supra note 2, 107 ('The fact that the parties are bound
by usages to which they have agreed derives from the general principles of party autonomy (Article 6).').
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Article 11 that contracts 'need not be concluded in or evidenced by writing', 99
authorises parties to a written contract to require, as part of their contract, that
any termination or modification be in writing. °00 Article 6 more expansively
enables '[t]he parties [to] exclude the application of [the] Convention or,
subject to Article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of any of its
provisions'. 10 The derogation permitted by Article 6 need not be explicit; the
parties may imply their intent to escape from all or part of the Convention.1 2
The parties' intent is controlling.103
99 CISG, supra note 2, Article 11, S Treaty Doe no 9,24, 19 ILM 674.
100 CISG, supra note 2, Article 29(2), S Treaty Doe no 9, 26, 19 ILM 677. Article 29(2) provides in
full: 'A contract in writing which contains a provision requiring any modification or termination by
agreement to be in writing may not be otherwise modified or terminated by agreement. However, a
party may be precluded by his conduct from asserting such a provision to the extent that the other
party has relied on that conduct.' Id.
101 CISG, supra note 2, Article 6, S Treaty Doc no 9,23, 19 ILM 673. In spite of the broad language of
Article 6, Professors Bianca and Bonell argue that the parties may not escape the application of
Article 7. Bianca and Bonell, supra note 2, 93-94.
102 A predecessor of Article 6, Article 3 of the Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods,
explicitly stated that exclusion of the Uniform Law by the parties 'may be express or implied'.
Working Group on the International Sale of Goods, 'Report on the Work of the Second Session,
7-18 December 1970' [1971] II UN Comm'n Int'l Trade L YB 43, at 55, UN Doc A/CN9/Ser
A/1971, in Documentary History, supra note 2, 61 (quoting ULIS Article 3). The reference to
implicit exclusion was deleted, not to deny power to implicitly exclude application of the Uniform
Law, but because '[slome representatives were concerned lest the special reference to "implied"
exclusion might encourage courts to conclude, on insufficient grounds, that the law had been wholly
excluded'. Id 45, 55. A later proposal to permit only express exclusion of the Convention was
rejected. See 'Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade on the Work of its
Tenth Session [1977] VIm UN Comm'n Int'l Trade L YB 56-57, at 29, UN Doc A/CN9/Ser
A/1977, in Documentary History, supra note 2, 322. According to several representatives, the
version of Article 6, which with only numbering changes was finally adopted, permits both express
and implied derogation. See 'UN Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, lst
Committee, 4th meeting', 4, at 248, UN Doc A/Conf 97/19 (1980), in Documentary History, supra
note 2, 469 (The chairman of the first committee 'considered that exclusion of the application of the
Convention, derogation from its provisions or variation of their effect could be either express or
implied, [and that] that was also apparently the conclusion which had emerged from the preparatory
work'.); id 11, 249, in Documentary History, supra note 2, 470 (According to the Norwegian
representative, 'the ... text which[, with non-substantive changes, became Article 6] ... meant that
derogation might be express or tacit'.); id 25, 250, in Documentary History, supra note 2, 471. (In
the United Kingdom representative's view, 'it was not necessary for the parties to indicate expressly
that they had decided to exclude the provisions of the Convention and to apply another legal rgime,
as the existing text of Article 5 [essentially the text adopted as Article 61 might lead one to
believe'.); see also Uniform Law, supra note 2, ss 76, 77, at 126, 129 (Because UNCITRAL did not
clearly resolve the express-implied exclusion debate, 'normal rules of construction of the contract
apply to the question of exclusion or modification of the Convention'. As a result, '[the Convention
may be excluded by the parties, but only by an express agreement or an agreement that is clearly
implied in fact'.); Rhodes, supra note 2, 400, 403 (concluding 'that the delegates reached an
impasse in [and did not resolve] the express or implied exclusion debate'; though agreeing that 'the
stronger argument is ... that parties may exclude the CISG by implication').
103 See 'UN Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Ist committee, 4th meeting',
11, at 249, UN Doc A/Conf 97/19 (1980), in Documentary History, supra note 2, 470 (In the
Norwegian representative's view, '[the determining factor [in deciding whether the parties have
derogated from the Convention] must always be the intention of the parties at the moment of
concluding the contract, whether or not such intention [has] been express or implied in Article [8].').
The United States Parol Evidence Rule Under the UN Convention on CISG 77
The principles, in Articles 6 and 29, of party autonomy and respect for the
intent of the parties are consistent with the parol evidence rule. As explained
above, through the parol evidence rule, the court identifies and safeguards the
parties' intent as to the effect of their writing. If the parties intend their
agreement to be an integration, the parol evidence rule prevents the fact finder
from considering evidence to the contrary. Absent the parol evidence rule, the
fact finder might conclude that the contract embraces terms that the parties did
not intend at the time of contracting to include in their agreement. Such a
conclusion would violate the parties' autonomy to define the complete terms
of their bargain. Application of the parol evidence rule thus advances the
principles underlying Articles 6 and 29.
Article 9
The parol evidence rule similarly conforms with the principles underlying
Article 9, which provides that contracting parties are bound by their course of
performance; their course of dealing; and well-known, widespread usages
which the parties have not excluded through their agreement. 104 The parol
evidence rule facilitates application of Article 9.105 As noted above, the parol
evidence rule admits evidence of course of performance, course of dealing,
and usages to supplement or explain the terms of written contracts, whether
integrated or not, 106 thus allowing the fact finder to apply the rules of Article 9
in outlining the contours of the parties' agreement. The parol evidence rule is
thus consistent with the principles underlying Article 9.
Articles 12 and 96
Likewise, the parol evidence rule is consistent with the principle underlying
Articles 12 and 96. Many CISG provisions allow contracts to be effected and
104 CISG, supra note 2, Article 9, S Treaty Doe no 9, at 24, 19 ILM 674. Article 9 reads: (1) the parties
are bound by any usage to which they have agreed and by any practices which they have established
between themselves; (2) the parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have impliedly made
applicable to their contract or its formation a usage of which the parties knew or ought to have
known and which in international trade is widely known to, and regularly observed by, parties to
contracts of the type involved in the particular trade concerned. Id.
105 See 'Legal Analysis of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods (1980)', S Treaty Doe no 9, 98th Cong, Ist Session 4 (1983) (CISG and the UCC both 'give
... contractual effect to' trade usage and course of dealing); Bianca and Bonell, supra note 2, 106
(noting that the treatment given course of dealing in Articles 8 and 9 'almost literally corresponds
with' the treatment given course of dealing by UCC ss 1-205, a section that the UCC parol evidence
rule incorporates by reference, see UCC ss 2-202(a)); Uniform Law, supra note 2,
s 120, at 177 (describing the UCC approach to usages of trade as similar to that of the Convention).
Compare Hillman et at, supra note 24, 3.05f3], 3-23 (Under the UCC, '[c]ourse of dealing and
trade usage evidence should be admissible except where all of the evidence, considered
preliminarily, clearly demonstrates that the parties specifically intended to exclude a course of
dealing or usage of trade') with CISG, supra note 1, Article 9, S Treaty Doe no 9, at 24, 19 ILM
674 (binding the parties, unless they otherwise agree, to their course of dealing as weli as to well-
known usages in the relevant trade). But cf Uniform Law, supra note 2, s 122, at 179 (Article 9, not
domestic law, dictates 'the circumstances that make a usage applicable').
106 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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altered without writing.107 Article 96 restricts these provisions by authorising
contracting States to declare that they will not be bound by any provision that
allows contracts to be formed or altered 'other than in writing'. 108 Article 12
enforces Article 96 by holding that:
[a]ny provision of Article 11, Article 29 or Part II of this Convention that
allows a contract of sale or its modification or termination by agreement or
any offer, acceptance or other indication of intention to be made in any
form other than in writing does not apply where any party has his place of
business in a contracting State which has made a declaration under Article
96 of this Convention. 109
Together, Articles 12 and 96 'recognise ... that some States consider that it is
an important element of public policy that contracts or their modification or
abrogation be in writing'.110 The general principle underlying Articles 12 and
96, then, is one of accommodation: accommodation of States' interest in
encouraging, even requiring, that contracts be in writing.,' CISG is so
committed to this principle of accommodation that it does not allow parties to
'derogate from or vary the effect of [Article 12]'.112
The strong accommodationist principle underlying Articles 12 and 96
supports application of the parol evidence rule, for that rule seeks to effect the
United States' interests in written contracts by encouraging parties to embody
107 See, for example, CISG, supra note 2, Article 11, S Treaty Doc no 9, at 24, 19 ILM 674 ('A
contract of sale need not be concluded in or evidenced by writing and is not subject to any other
requirement as to form.'); id Article 29(1), S Treaty Doec no 9, at 27, 19 ILM 677 ('A contract may
be modified or terminated by the mere agreement of the parties.').
108 CISG, supra note 2, Article 96, S Treaty Doc no 9, at 41, 19 ILM 693-94. Article 96 provides: 'A
Contracting State whose legislation requires contracts of sale to be concluded in or evidenced by
writing may at any time make a declaration in accordance with Article 12 that any provision of
Article 11, Article 29, or Part U1 of this Convention, that allows a contract of sale or its modification
or termination by agreement or any offer, acceptance, or other indication of intention to be made in
any form other than in writing, does not apply where any party has his place of business in that
State.' Id.
109 CISG, supra note 2, Article 12, S Treaty Doe no 9, at 24, 19 ILM 674.
110 'Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Prepared
by the Secretariat, UN Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods Article 11, cmt
1', at 20, UN Doec A/Conf 97/19 (1980), in Documentary History, supra note 2, 410 (commenting
on a predecessor of current Article 12).
111 See Bianca and Bonell, supra note 2, 125 ('Article 12 aims at accommodating the special demands
of those States whose legal systems impose the written form for contracts of international sales for
purposes of validity, evidence and administrative control ... ').
112 CISG, supra note 2, Article 12, S Treaty Doec no 9, at 24, 19 ILM 674; see also CISG, supra note 2,
Article 6, S Treaty Doc no 9, 23, 19 ILM 673 ('The parties may ... subject to Article 12, derogate
from or vary the effect of any of [the Convention's] provisions.'); 'Commentary on the Draft
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Prepared by the Secretariat, UN
Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods Article 11, cmt 3, at 20', UN Doec
A/Conf 97119 (1980), in Documentary History, supra note 2, 410 ('Since the requirement of writing
in relation to the matters mentioned in Article [12] is considered to be a question of public policy in
some States, the general principle of party autonomy is not applicable to ... Article [12].
Accordingly, Article [12] cannot be varied or derogated from by the parties.'); Bianca and Bonell,
supra note 2, 127 ('Article 12 is the only provision of the Convention which is of a mandatory
character...').
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their contracts in writing, preventing 'perjured or otherwise unreliable
testimony of oral terms' to contradict the terms of a writing, and excluding
'prior agreements ... superseded by the [written contract] under a theory of
merger'.1 3 Thus, the parol evidence rule comports with the general principle
of accommodation for States' interests in written contracts. 114
In sum, because the parol evidence rule conforms 'with the general
principles on which [the Convention] is based', the rule may be applied under
Article 7(2) to resolve the unsettled question of what constitutes due
consideration of extrinsic evidence in determining the parties' integrationist
intent. 115
Conclusion
As this article has argued, the parol evidence rule may be seen as an
appropriately-international application of Article 8, or alternatively, as a rule,
consistent with general principles underlying the Convention, that resolves the
question of what constitutes 'due consideration ... [of] all relevant
circumstances' 116 in determining the parties' intent as to the effect of their
writing. Under either of these perspectives, the parol evidence rule may
legitimately be applied to contracts governed by the Convention. Thus, while
the Fifth Circuit in Beijing Metals failed to reveal the analysis supporting its
holding that the parol evidence rule applies to CISG contracts, and while
113 Gordon, supra note 19, 647 (citing J Calamari and J Perillo, The Law of Contracts Third Edition
(1987) 137); see supra note 33 and accompanying text. But cf 'Legal Analysis of the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods', supra note 105, S Treaty Doe no 9, 6
(recommending that the United States not make an Article 96 declaration; also noting that '[m]ost
delegates ... including the United States, concluded that formal requirements [are] inconsistent with
modem commercial practice,' thus suggesting that the policies behind the parol evidence rule are
not as strong in the international trade arena).
114 It may be argued that Articles 12 and 96 would support application of the parol evidence rule only if
the United States had made an Article 96 declaration. Because United States legislation does not
uniformly require contracts to be in writing, however, such a declaration would not have been
appropriate or even available to the United States. See CISG, supra note 2, Article 96, S Treaty Doe
no 96, at 24, 19 ILM 674; 'Report of the First Committee, UN Conference on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods' 1st Comm', Article 10, 7(iv), at 91, UN Doe A/Conf 97/19 (1980), in
Documentary ll tory, supra note 2, 663 (recording that a Netherlands' proposal - which would
have allowed States to make an Article 96 declaration to require only certain types of contracts to be
in writing - was rejected). But cf Declarations Table, supra note 3, 286 (noting that '[the People's
Republic of China does not consider itself to be bound by ... Article I 1 as well as the provisions in
the Convention relating to the content of Article 11' even though China apparently did not make an
Article 96 declaration). Nor could the United States have lodged a reservation to CISG provisions
allowing contracts to be effected or modified without a writing, for '[nlo reservations are permitted
except those expressly authorised in this Convention.' CISG, supra note 2, Article 98, S Treaty Doe
no 9, at 42, 19 ILM 694. Thus, the United States appropriately adopted the Convention without
making a declaration or reservation to the Convention's oral contracting allowances. Just as
appropriately, the United States may apply the parol evidence rule in harmony with the articles that
accommodate States' interests in written contracts.
115 CISG, supra note 2. Article 7(2), S Treaty Doe no 9, at 24, 19 ILM 673.
116 CISG, supra note 2, Article 8(3), S Treaty Doe no 9, at 24, 19 ILM 673.
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commentators such as Professor Flechtner have contested that holding, this
article's analysis justifies the court's conclusion. This article thus supplements
the decision in Beijing Metals, strengthening that decision as a worldwide
precedent while simultaneously laying bare the opinion's possible reasoning
to attack by supporters of a strictly international interpretation of CISG.
